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China, after 15 years of strenuous negotiation, formally became the 143
rd member of the 
World Trade Organization in December 2001. WTO membership is generally perceived 
as beneficial by the Chinese society, given the aggregate welfare gains from a more open 
economy predicted by economic theory. However, some objections to WTO membership 
were raised by sectors of the society directly involved with import competing industries, 
which will be negatively affected by the increase in competition derived from WTO 
accession. In particular, state-owned enterprises (SOE) which are very inefficient and 
rely heavily on government support will be considerably affected by China’s accession to 
the WTO. 
 
China’s SOE sector is large. In 2000, the SOE sector produced 24% of industrial output, 
and accounted for 42% of urban employment
1. The SOE sector is also very inefficient, 
with half of all firms making losses.
2 Given the size and inefficiency of the SOE, the 
Chinese economy would substantially benefit from any reforms that reallocated resources 
                                                 
1 Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
2 World Bank “China’s Management of Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder”, 1997. 
  1away from the SOE sector. Restructuring the SOE sector should be a priority if China is 
to sustain high rates of economic growth. The policies agreed upon accession to the 
WTO, which call for increased competition and a more open economy, represent an 
excellent channel for restructuring the SOE.  
 
The SOE sector is highly subsidized. SOE essentially receive two types of subsidies: 
direct government subsidies from the state and local governments, and indirect subsidies 
from state-owned banks through preferential loans. Both types of subsidies will be 
substantially reduced under WTO membership. Regarding direct subsidies, China signed 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), according to which 
China will substantially reduce state level subsidies to the SOE sector. China also agreed 
to gradually open up its financial service sector, which will expose state-owned banks to 
foreign competition. In a more competitive environment state banks will have to become 
more profit-oriented and limit their implicit financial subsidies to the SOE sector. 
Provisions from WTO accession will, thus, significantly reduce subsidies to the SOE 
sector, forcing the restructuring of some SOE and causing bankruptcies and massive 
layoffs.  
 
Studying in what manner and to what extent the SOE sector will be affected by WTO 
membership, an important issue often left out of general studies of China and the WTO, 
is the focus of this paper. We argue that WTO accession is a major step toward further 
economic reform in China, of which restructuring the SOE is an integral part. We first 
show that, even though the SOE sector has long been a major target of economic reform, 
  2substantial improvement in the SOE sector has yet to be achieved. We present evidence 
of the poor economic performance of SOE and of the burden they represent to Chinese 
economic growth. Finally, we use economic theory developed in Bajona and Chu (2003) 
to quantitatively analyze the economic effects of both direct subsidies and indirect 
financial subsidies to the SOE sector. We obtain that subsidies to the SOE sector have 
important effects on output, productivity, and welfare. The economic gains of 
restructuring the SOE sector derived from WTO accession may be substantial and should 
be added to the conventional gains derived from tariff reduction. Once the effect of WTO 
membership on SOE is taken into account, the overall benefits of trade liberalization are 
much higher than what traditional studies suggest. 
 
A Brief History of China’s SOE reform 
China started its economic reforms in 1979 with the introduction of structural changes in 
the agricultural sector. In its first stages, the economic reform did not include the 
industrial sector (composed mainly by SOE), which was still recovering from the damage 
suffered during the Cultural Revolution
3.  Regarding SOE, the main focus of the 
government was on microeconomic management: improving quality controls, accounting, 
training and management. The management of the SOE operated as an administrative 
unit, not a market entity. Executives were promoted as government officials. The SOE 
submitted an annual budget. Decisions on hiring, investment, and wage compensation 
had to be approved by several levels of government. Moreover, the government, not the 
markets, determined the prices charged and the quantities produced. The SOE turned over 
                                                 
3 The Cultural Revolution covered the period from 1966-76. It caused anarchy and disorder throughout the 
nation, disrupting economic activity in the industrial and service sectors.  
  3all the revenue to the administration, which then made the decision on how much to give 
back to the SOE. Under such a system, it is evident that the SOE sector did not have the 
incentives, or the ability, to be efficient (autonomy in decision making).  
 
Starting in 1981, reforming the SOE sector became a priority. The central government 
began to promote the responsibility system in the SOE sector, by introducing limited 
incentives and autonomy. Under the responsibility system, the management of the SOE 
was allowed to keep the profits from any production that exceeded the required annual 
production quota submitted by the government. At this time, the government also 
encouraged self-employment and collectively-owned enterprises. This was the first 
attempt to diversify the ownership structure of industries.  
 
In 1983, following a general fiscal reform, the government changed the way in which the 
SOE paid their proceeds to the government. Instead of submitting their profits, the SOE 
were required under the new fiscal scheme to pay taxes to the government. The new 
payment structure increased the autonomy of the SOE. In 1984, the government formally 
announced the decision to deepen the responsibility system by linking workers’ 
compensation with their contribution to production.
4 At the same time, China started to 
aggressively deregulate price controls. China continued to encourage the establishment of 
collective enterprises and jointly-established private enterprises. The non-SOE sector 
continued to increase at a rapid rate, becoming a direct market competitor to the SOE 
                                                 
4 The Central Committee of CCP’s Decision on Economic Institutional Reform, 1984, the third meeting of 
the 12
th National Convention of CCP. 
  4sector in some areas of the economy where the SOE had previously enjoyed monopoly 
power. 
 
In 1993 the reform of the SOE sector entered a new era. For the first time, the reform 
agenda called for the privatization and diversification of ownership for the small to mid-
sized SOE. Furthermore, SOE that were incurring big losses were allowed to merge or go 
bankrupt. This stage of the reform was completed rather satisfactorily for small 
enterprises, but it was implemented in much less extent for the mid to large-sized SOE. 
As a result, the majority of mid and large size SOE did not improve their efficiency or 
profitability. 
 
In summary, through different stages the SOE reform went from microeconomic 
adjustment, to limited autonomy, to privatization; and from giving no economic incentive 
to workers and managers, to giving partial incentives, to full incentive in the case of 
privatized SOE. However, in spite of the wide reach of the SOE reform, it failed to 
improve the efficiency of the SOE sector as a whole. A proof of this is the fact that in 
1996 the SOE sector suffered a net loss for the first time. All attempts to reform the SOE 
sector without privatization have been unsuccessful. Even though privatization is still 
limited to small and medium SOE, the government has come to the realization of its 
necessity for good economic performance, and the trend is expected to continue in the 
future. 
 
  5 In the next section, we discuss the SOE performance throughout these stages of reform 
in more detail to illustrate this point.  
 
Performance of China’s SOE sector during the reform era 
State-owned enterprises (SOE) had been the backbone of the pre-reform Chinese 
economy. SOE produced 78% of total industrial output at their peak in 1978, with 
collectively-owned enterprises accounting for the rest of industrial output. No other type 
of ownership was allowed at that time. Before economic reform the government set 
prices charged, quantities produced, and redistributed revenues. China suffered the 
economic inefficiencies associated with such a centrally planned system: stagnant 
economic growth and overall scarcity of consumption and capital goods. Rationing was 
prevailing in China through the 1980s.  
 
Since the beginning of the reforms, China has experienced gradual but significant 
economic changes that have transformed it from a commanding economy to a market-
oriented economy. The degree of success of the reforms is reflected in the near double-
digit annual growth in GDP that China has experienced in the past twenty-five years. 
Underlying the rapid GDP growth are many far-reaching institutional and structural 
reforms that include allowing private ownership, the reform of SOE, the liberalization of 
international trade and foreign direct investment, the abolition of price controls, and the 
establishment of many markets such as capital markets, labor markets, and stock markets. 
All these reforms directly or indirectly have substantially weakened the role of the SOE 
as sources of industrial production. In particular, the economic performance of the SOE 
has deteriorated due to increasing competition from other forms of ownership.  
  6 
Table 1 presents data on gross industrial output by ownership starting in 1978, as well as 
the share of industrial output produced by SOE and non-state and non-collective 
ownerships. The share of output produced by SOE gradually decreased (from 78% in 
1978 to 28% in 1999) as industrial enterprises of other forms of ownership were created 
as a result of economic reform. The lower share of SOE output reflects the highest 
growth rate of production by the other forms of ownership.  In fact, the SOE’s output 
expanded over the periods, as financial and other resources continued to flow into the 
state sector. Even though the SOE produced only 28% of industrial output in 1999, they 
received half of the investment (table 2). Despite of this continuing investment by the 
state on the SOE, growth in the SOE sector was low. The share of output produced by 
non-state and non-collective ownerships increased rapidly after the approval in 1979 of 
these forms of ownership, reaching 44% of total output in 1999. 
 
The Chinese overall employment expanded rapidly but unevenly across sectors during 
the period of study. In particular, the farming sector decreased substantially following 
economic reforms, which implies that non-farm and urban employment grew at much 
faster rates than total employment. Since the SOE are mainly in the industrial sector, 
computing the SOE shares of non-farm and urban employment gives a more accurate 
view of the importance of the SOE as providers of employment. Table 3 presents data on 
employment levels as well as SOE shares of employment for each of the three categories 
described above. The table shows that the SOE’s share of total employment experienced 
a more gradual decline that its output share, decreasing only 8 percentage points from 
  718.6% in 1978 to 10.5% in 2001. It is worth noticing that most of this decline was 
experienced in the period 1996-2001, when the SOE’s employment share dropped 6 
percentage points. From this data, we are tempted to conclude that SOE have preserved 
their role as providers of employment through the reform process, keeping up with 
employment growth. The SOE shares of urban and non-farm employment present a 
different picture, however. In terms of urban employment, the SOE share decreased much 
faster, from 78% in 1971 to 31% in 2001. Taking only into account non-farm 
employment, the SOE share decreased form 60.4% in 1978 to 18.7% in 2001. These 
numbers reflect the fact that the SOE were not able to keep up with the rapid increase in 
urban and non-farm employment over the period of study, which was mainly driven by 
the non-state sector. Regarding absolute employment levels, total SOE employment 
consistently expanded until 1995.  The year 1996 marks the first actual decrease in the 
level of SOE employment, which indicates that the SOE reform took a turning point in 
1995 when the speed of privatization and bankruptcy was accelerated. Therefore, the 
reduction in the SOE employment shares prior to 1995 is only showing the inability of 
the SOE sector to create employment at the same speed as the non-state sectors. 
 
 Data on SOE employment are, in general, a good indicator of the changes prompted by 
the SOE reform. One key justification for the existence of the state-owned sector is to 
provide employment. According to the communism ideal, the great advantage of a 
socialist or a communist society is to remove the unemployment that plagues capitalist 
economies. Following this view, government officials determine the hiring and firing 
decisions in the SOE. Therefore, any decline in employment should be interpreted as a 
  8sign that the government priorities have shifted to efficiency instead of employment 
creation. Figure 1 plots SOE employment as a share of urban, non-farm and total 
employment from 1977 to 2001.  All three shares of SOE employment followed a similar 
pattern: they gradually decreased until 1990 when the decrease slowed down or even 
stalled. The slowdown in 1990 coincides with the slowdown of the reforms that occurred 
after the Tiananmen Square student movement. In 1998 the shares decrease sharply, as 
the reform of the SOE sector resumed. From 1997 to 2001 the relative reduction of the 
SOE employment is higher than in the previous 20-year period, reflecting the strong 
determination and enforcement of SOE reform since the mid 1990s.  
 
Since the early 1990s the performance of the SOE sector has continuously deteriorated to 
the point that the sector as a whole is making net losses since the late 1990s. Loss-making 
SOE cannot operate without government support. Yet not only do the loss-making firms 
survive, but their workers also receive wage increases similar to those received by 
workers in profitable firms. Given their low productivity, this is only possible thanks to 
external support from the government and the financial sector (World Bank, 1996). 
Indeed, as shown in Table 4, the magnitude of direct subsidies from the government to 
SOE is very large. In 1990, direct subsidies to SOE represented 4.5% of total SOE 
output, gradually dropping to 1% by 1998, when the last step of the SOE reforms was 
implemented. However, the decrease in direct subsidies did not translate into a decrease 
in total subsidies. As the government reduced direct subsidies, they were replaced by 
loans from state banks, which register around 30-50% of non-performing loans, most of 
them to inefficient SOE. In order to correctly assess the inefficiencies of the SOE, theses 
  9loans should be counted as net SOE losses. It is estimated that the total value of non-
performing loans has already reached 40% of GDP. When including losses through rural 
credit cooperatives, not considered in these estimates, the total loss can amount to 45-
50% of GDP (Bottelier 2001). Under the conservative assumption that 20% of these non-
performing loans can be recovered, adding the value of non-performing loans to the 
direct subsidies we obtain average SOE annual losses of 6% of GDP for the past decade.
5 
Given that the SOE sector accounted for only 36 % of GDP in 1999 (dropping from 50% 
from 1980, Wang 2003), the explicit and implicit subsidies to SOE have reached an 
annual rate of 12-16% of SOE. This number illustrates the high degree of government 
subsidies to the SOE sector in China.  
 
Moreover, the high non-performing loans ratio in state banks poses a serious challenge to 
the financial stability of the Chinese economy. This precarious level of non-performing 
loans substantially weakens the Chinese financial system, making the possibility of a 
financial crisis a tangible threat.  
 
Finally, the SOE’s management structure, with managers having increased autonomy to 
manipulate the assets but not increased personal stake for mishandling of assets has 
promoted on-the-job-consumption and embezzlement. These have become prevalent in 
China. Since the government has always subsidized inefficient SOE, any losses from 
misused funds or wasted resources are covered by the government.  In the early 1980s, 
managers did not have much room to manipulate the system because of their extremely 
                                                 
5 A 20% recovery rate is conservative if we compare it to the 9% recovery rate for 2001 estimated by 
Bottelier (2001).  
  10limited autonomy. As reforms deepened, managers obtained control over an increasing 
amounts of funds, which gave them the ability to fulfill their own interests at the cost of 
the public interest. As long as the government continues to subsidize the inefficient SOE, 
this sort of behavior is deemed to continue, if not worsen.  
 
In summary, the importance of the SOE sector has declined in terms of its contribution to 
output and employment since the beginning of the economic reform. The poor economic 
performance of the SOE has significantly dragged the entire country’s economic growth. 
The SOE sector absorbs a big proportion of households’ savings while the growing 
private sector is short of funds for expansion. The SOE enjoy administrative monopoly in 
many sectors of the economy (Chen 2000), prohibiting the development of private 
businesses in those sectors. As a result, not only the SOE are no longer the backbone of 
the Chinese economy, they have become the drain of economic resources, an impediment 
toward economic growth, and an important factor that may destabilize the country’s 
financial sector. Therefore, deeper fundamental reforms on SOE are crucial for China’s 
continuing growth. Unsuccessful reforms can well render the country into economic 
turmoil. It was precisely after realizing the need of these deeper economic reforms that 
China started pursuing membership in the WTO with unprecedented efforts and 
determination.  
 
WTO as an Instrument to Promote Domestic Reform: A Hypothesis  
In order to solve the existing problems in the SOE sector outlined above, China has to 
further implement deeper reforms which include further privatization and deregulation.  
  11Clearly, returning to the old regime is not desirable. China has, thus, to push forward 
reforms that are more fundamental than the reforms undergone during the 1990s. As the 
government realized that further reforms in the SOE sector were needed it increased the 
political priority of accessing the WTO. The extent to which WTO accession has become 
a priority was documented when Premier Zhu himself attended the China-US bilateral 
negotiations in person and made several major concessions that broke the negotiations’ 
deadlock, allowing China to continue pursuing WTO membership
6. Furthermore, many 
Chinese economists and the government itself claim that accession to the WTO was not 
pursued for the benefit of businesses, but rather to regulate the government’s behavior. 
Therefore, WTO accession for China is the accession for the government; it is a channel 
through which the government will transform its governance. 
7 
8 The former Premier Zhu 
Rongji stated explicitly that WTO accession was a decision made by the government to 
promote further reforms and open up the economy.
9 Yining Li considered WTO as a tool 
to force the difficult reform agenda.
 10 Wen Hai (2000) explicitly state that one important 
                                                 
6 Asiaweek Magazine (“The Return of Zhu Rongji,” November 26, 1999 Vol. 25 No. 47) reported: “In a 
pivotal eleventh-hour move last week, just when the talks seemed about to collapse, the premier met with 
Barshefsky for 90 minutes in Zhongnanhai. The negotiations took on new life. Two days later, Zhu 
reportedly met again with the U.S. team. The agreement was signed within hours.” Similarly, People’s 
Daily (“Premier Zhu Meets Lee Kuan Yew,” June 14, 2000): “Premier Zhu Rongji, in a meeting with 
Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew Tuesday, said that China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is necessary for speeding up the country's reform and opening-up drive.” 
7 Guangxi, Liu, November 13, 2001, Jiefang Daily.  
8 Guangxi, Liu, “China's WTO commitments as a lever can be used to complete the transition to a more 
market-oriented economy as soon as practicable”. DR. Guangxi Liu is Executive Vice-Chairman of 
Shanghai WTO Research Centre and Vice President of Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade. Dr. Liu served 
as Special Assistant to Vice Minister Long Yongtu, Chief Trade Representative (CTR), Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (Moftec). 
9 Xinhua News Dec. 9, 2001, reported that Zhu Rongji talked at a WTO workshop for provincial and 
ministerial officials.  
10 Famous Chinese Economist Yining Li said in “http://finance.sina.com.cn Oct. 9, 2000, 
http://www.takungpao.com/”(Chinese), that WTO accession will force China  SOE to reform.  
  12implication of China’s WTO accession is to “accelerate the reforms in state-owned 
enterprises and to help to develop private enterprises in the Chinese economy.”  
11 
 
WTO is a multilateral trading system. By having its rules and agreements signed by the 
member governments and ratified by their parliaments, WTO agreements “are the legal 
ground-rules for international commerce”.
12 By signing an international treaty, and 
specifying the removal of subsidies and the introduction of foreign competition, WTO 
accession becomes a strategic maneuver that changes the perception of the role of the 
central government on the reform of the SOE. Now the government actions are seen as 
the fulfillment of an international obligation. Given China’s tendency to recognize the 
legitimacy of international law, the enforcement of reforms is much easier through the 
WTO than through the domestic bureaucracy.  
 
 In fact, WTO accession played a key role in pivoting domestic reforms even before the 
formal accession in December 2001. Prior to accession, the Chinese government made 
the decision to allow private ownership in all sectors that China was to open to foreign 
business upon becoming a member of the WTO. In this manner, WTO accession easily 
solved issues related to the status of domestic private firms: if national treatment was to 
be granted to foreign companies there was no excuse not to grant national treatment to 
domestic private enterprises. Through WTO accession domestic private sectors, despite 
                                                 
11 Wen Hai, 2000.  “China’s Wto Membership: Significance And Implications,” China Center for 
Economic Research (CCER), Peking University, China, NO. E2000007, September 9, 2000 
12 World Trade Organization (WTO) official website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm 
  13of their weak political voice, were able to wrench away the monopoly rights of the SOE 
and become a growing part of the Chinese economy. 
 
Summarizing, in light of China’s pressing need for further reform (especially in the SOE 
sector), WTO accession is viewed as a useful instrument to lay down a framework for 
economic reform and to bring external forces toward implementation of the reforms. In 
the next section we enumerate the main provisions of China’s accession documents that 
are relevant for the reform of the SOE sector. These provisions give an idea of the type of 
reforms that the Chinese government needs to implement under the umbrella of the 
WTO. 
 
The relevant accession documents that affect the SOE sector 
The document of China’s accession to the WTO consists of more than 900 pages with 
many provisions that, directly or indirectly, affect the SOE. We discuss such provisions 
in this section. 
13  
 
China fully signed the “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” (SCM). 
The SCM Agreement specifically deals with government subsidies to the SOE sector. In 
particular, according to article 1 of the SCM Agreement, SOE subsides are considered 
“specific subsidies”, which are actionable under the agreement. According to Article 6.1 
(b) (c) (d) of the SCM agreement, “subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an 
industry” or the forgiveness of debts to a loss-making enterprise are considered a serious 
                                                 
13 The official accession documents for China’s accession can be found at WTO official website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm 
  14prejudice. The Chinese subsidies to loss-making SOE meet these criteria and are, thus, 
vulnerable to disputes and potential countervailing measures by the disputing WTO 
members.  
 
Chinese subsidies to loss-making SOE are explicitly mentioned in Appendices 5A and 5B 
of China’s WTO agreement. Appendix 5A gives notification of existing government 
subsidies and Appendix 5B gives a list of subsidies that need to be phased out starting in 
2001, which includes a list of “Subsidies Provided To Certain State-Owned Enterprises 
Which Are Running at a Loss”. A comparison of the two documents reveals that China 
has committed to remove all central government subsidies listed in Appendix 5A, but 
there is no provision that requires the removal of subsidies given by local governments. 
According to the monetary values of the subsidies listed in Appendix 5A, the subsidies 
given by the central government (which are to be phased out) represent 24% of all 
explicit subsidies. 
  
China not only did allow subsidies to SOE to be covered under the SCM agreement, but 
it also agreed to terms that make invoking countervailing measures by a disputing party 
rather easy. Specifically, China agreed not to request the disputing member to show 
positive evidence of economic injury as a result of the disputed subsidies, as indicated in 
paragraph 171 of the Report From The Working Party On The Accession Of China.
14 
Article 27.8 explicitly requires the disputing party to show positive evidence of injury. 
Therefore, revoking article 27.8 implies that any WTO member can lodge complaints 
                                                 
14 According to paragraph 171, “China would not seek to invoke Articles 27.8, 27.9 and 27.13 of the 
SCM Agreement.” 
  15over Chinese subsidies to SOE without actually showing that it has produced actual 
injury. This greatly reduces the cost of filing such a complaint against China. 
Nevertheless, China does not seem to plan to eliminate the SOE sector entirely. As 
indicated in the same 171
st paragraph of the Report, China will “reserve the right to 
benefit from the provisions of Articles 27.10, 27.11, 27.12 and 27.15 of the 
SCM Agreement”. These provisions require the disputing member to drop the 
investigation if the subsidy does not exceed 2% per unit (3% for the initial eight years of 
accession). The fact that China agreed to such terms can be interpreted as China’s being 
prepared to give up the majority of its subsidies to the SOE sector. 
 
SOE are explicitly mentioned in paragraphs 172 and 173 of the Report, where China 
pledges that “China's objective is that state-owned enterprises, including banks, should be 
run on a commercial basis and be responsible for their own profits and losses.” We read 
this pledge as a commitment to eliminate all forms of subsidies to the SOE sector. 
According to paragraph 1.2 of the Accession Protocol, these commitments represent an 
integral part of the WTO agreement. Therefore, even though an official time table for the 
elimination of SOE subsidies is not set (which may question its eventual enforcement) 
the commitment is explicitly made in the documents of WTO accession.  
 
In the WTO accession agreement, China committed to largely open up its financial 
sector. As the government gradually reduced the direct subsidies to the SOE sectors, 
financial support from state-owned banks played an increasingly important role in 
sustaining loss-making SOE. A more open financial sector will force the state banks to be 
  16more profit oriented and, as a result, to substantially reduce financial support to SOE in 
the form of low interest rates, automatic rollover of interests and principals, and preferred 
access to credit.  
 
Finally, the WTO accession package allows market access to many service sectors in 
which the SOE originally had monopoly status, like the distribution services sector. 
These sectors were previously closed to both domestic private firms as well as foreign 
firms. Under the WTO agreement, as private firms enter the market, the SOE will face 
increasing competition which will force them to restructure. 
   
In summary, the WTO agreement makes direct subsidies to SOE more difficult to 
implement. Furthermore, by requiring a more open financial sector, WTO membership 
forces banks to be more profit-oriented and to reduce lending to non-performing SOE.  
Both factors combined will promote the restructuring of the SOE sector and the closing 
of inefficient SOE.  
 
We take China’s signing on all these provisions affecting the SOE sector as evidence that 
the Chinese government is using WTO membership as an instrument to promote 
unpopular SOE reforms. At the time of accession SOE still represented 60% of fiscal 
revenue, and were deeply vested into the various ministries. Confronting all these vested 
interests directly would encounter strong resistance. By bundling the domestic reforms 
together with the provisions in the WTO agreement, the SOE reforms become a duty to 
fulfill an international commitment and can be introduced without the consent of the 
  17ministries. As a result, fundamental reform of the SOE sector becomes much easier to 
implement after China’s WTO accession.  
 
In the next section we use economic modeling to study the long run effects of 
government subsidies to SOE in an economy’s production, productivity and welfare. 
 
Economic Analysis  
In this section we present an economic exercise designed to study the long run effects of 
the SOE reforms induced by WTO membership on China’s GDP and welfare. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, the principal effects of WTO accession on the SOE 
sector will be on direct government subsidies to the SOE and on subsidized loans from 
state banks to the SOE. These provisions will significantly reduce most of the SOE 
financial support from the government and, therefore, the SOE will have to compete in 
more equalitarian grounds with private enterprises. 
 
In our theoretical framework SOE differ from private firms in three key aspects: their 
technology level, their ability to decide the amount of labor to hire, and their costs of 
capital. In line with the SOE’s role as promoters of employment, we assume that the SOE 
have to keep a minimum level of employment designated by the government. If the 
minimum level of employment is set above its optimal level the SOE incurs in a loss, 
which is paid by the government in the form of a direct subsidy. All direct subsidies in 
our model are derived from this minimum labor restriction. We model the preferential 
treatment by state banks as a subsidy to the cost of capital, which translates into lower 
  18effective rental rates of capital for the SOE sector. In order to isolate the effects of the 
SOE reforms, we keep the tariff rates constant over time and we assume that international 
capital markets are closed, so that China has to balance trade every period.
15  
 
The framework used in our analysis is adopted from Bajona and Chu (2003). Bajona and 
Chu (2003) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with perfect foresight, where 
consumers make consumption and saving decisions with the objective of maximizing 
their intertemporal utility of consumption. There are two sectors in the model: a traded 
sector and a non-traded sector. In each sector, two types of firms co-exist: private firms, 
which maximize profits, and SOE, which also maximize profits given the restrictions on 
minimum employment levels imposed by the government. Output is produced using 
capital and labor in a constant returns to scale technology. Technologies are potentially 
different across sectors and across forms of ownership. The specific functional forms 
used in the model can be found in the appendix. 
 
In order to analyze the long run effects of SOE subsidies, we take the calibrated model 
from Bajona and Chu (2003) and perform comparative statics on the values of the two 





                                                 
15 See Bajona and Chu (2003) for a similar analysis with open international capital markets. 
16 Bajona and Chu (2003) calibrate the parameter values of the model economy to match data on the 
National Income and Product Accounts, input-output matrix and SOE sector for the Chinese economy in 
1997. 
  19Labor restriction 
Figure 2 presents values of the long run level of GDP, welfare improvements (measured 
in terms of equivalent variation) and SOE shares of output as functions of the degree of 
reduction of the minimum labor restriction.
17 Specifically, a point  in the graph for 
GDP, for instance, means that   is the long run value of GDP in an economy where the 
minimum labor restriction is 65% lower than its calibrated value, which is taken as a 
benchmark.  From figure 2 we observe that the minimum labor restriction has an almost 
linear effect on GDP and on welfare, with welfare gains increasing faster than GDP as the 
minimum labor restriction is gradually reduced. In terms of magnitudes, a 10% reduction 
in the minimum labor restriction translates into a 1.7% increase in real GDP and a 2.7% 
increase in welfare. A 90% reduction in the labor restriction delivers a 15% increase in 
GDP and a 24% increase in welfare. SOE shares also decrease in an almost linear way as 
the minimum labor restriction is reduced. This linear relationship is not surprising, given 





Subsidies to capital 
The effects of subsidies to capital on output, welfare and the SOE shares are plotted in 
figure 3.  
Real GDP decreases with the subsidy, since the optimal steady state level of capital stock 
decreases as the subsidy is reduced. Lower subsidies to capital imply a lower capital 
stock in steady state since capital becomes more expensive for the SOE, inducing them to 
                                                 
17 The equivalent variation measures the percentage increase in consumption that would give a consumer  
in the benchmark economy the same welfare as a consumer in the economy with the reduced subsidy. 
  20accumulate less of it.  Notice that lower GDP in steady state does not need to translate 
into lower welfare, since the amount of output that goes to replace depreciated capital 
also decreases. In particular, from the graph plotting welfare changes, we see that welfare 
gains increase with any reduction of the subsidy. This increase in welfare gains, though, 
is not linear with respect to the subsidy reduction as in the case of the minimum labor 
restriction. As it is shown in the second graph of figure 3, welfare gains have a hump-
shape. This result is related to the Golden Rule level of capital, that is, the steady state 
level of capital that delivers optimal consumption. Given that there is a labor restriction, 
the optimal subsidy to capital that delivers the maximum consumption in steady state is 
positive. This result suggest that when labor restrictions are in place, in a world where 
subsidized firms interact with competitive firms, small positive subsidies to capital may 
be welfare improving. In particular, a 10% reduction in capital subsidies increases 
welfare by 1.8%, whereas a reduction of the subsidy by 90% increases welfare by only 
1.1%. The optimal subsidy, taken as given the calibrated minimum labor restriction, is of 
2.3% which is achieved with a 25% reduction in the subsidy to capital. 
 
Regarding SOE shares, reducing subsidies to capital reduces the SOE share in the traded 
sector, but the SOE share in the non-traded sector has a hump-like shape: it increases for 
small reductions in the subsidy to capital, but it decreases once the subsidy has been 
sufficiently reduced. The intuition is simple: in the calibrated model, private firms are 
relatively more productive in the traded sector than in the non-traded sector. Furthermore, 
SOE that produce traded goods are highly subsidized. As the subsidy to capital is 
reduced, differences in productivity become more important in determining the long run 
  21specialization in production and private firms enter the traded sector more aggressively. 
Once the subsidy to capital is sufficiently reduced, differences in productivity become the 
dominant effect, and the SOE shares decrease in both industries. The turning point in the 
share of SOE in the non-traded sector occurs with a 45% reduction in the subsidy. 
Summarizing, the hump-like shape shows the tradeoff between reallocation of capital 
within and between industries. This is an interesting result: it suggests that if the 
government only mildly reduces the subsidies to the SOE, the SOE will see increase in its 
share in the service sector.  
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we examine the impact of China’s accession to the WTO on the SOE sector. 
We document the failure of the different attempts to reform the SOE sector that started in 
1979. By the late 1990s, the entire SOE sector was in debt and the state banks were at the 
verge of insolvency burdened with non-performing loans to the SOE firms. In view of 
this situation, we hypothesized that an important rationale, among many others, of 
China’s pursue of WTO membership is the ability to use WTO accession to seal the 
agenda for fundamental reforms, which has been difficult to implement by domestically 
measures alone, is. To back up our hypothesis, we document various aspects of China’s 
accession agreement that directly affect the SOE sector. Upon accession China 
committed to partially eliminate sate subsidies and to eventually let all SOE operate on a 
commercial basis, making them responsible for their own profits and losses. Two other 
important commitments that affect the SOE sector are the opening of the financial sector, 
which will substantially undermine the financial backup of the state firms, and the 
  22opening of many sectors that used to be exclusive ground of SOE. Overall, this is clearly 
a radical reform agenda, and has good perspectives for success.  The inefficiency of the 
SOE sector, when coupled with the potential financial instabilities it causes, is a vital 
problem that needs to be solved if the Chinese economy is to continue to grow. 
Therefore, we argue that China’s WTO accession has important implications for the 
Chinese economy that go beyond simple gains from tariff reduction that are usually 
associated with WTO membership.  
In order to quantify the possible gains from SOE reform, we describe the results of a 
quantitative analysis of the effects of SOE subsidies on GDP and welfare. Keeping tariffs 
constant, we find that a 10% of reduction in the minimum labor restriction improves long 
run welfare by 2.7% whereas 10% reduction in the subsidies to capital increases welfare 
by 1.8%. Given that the subsidy reductions driven by provisions from the WTO are likely 
to exceed 10%, the welfare effects of SOE reform induced by the WTO agreement are 
likely to be much bigger and more significant that the direct gains obtained from tariff 
reduction. 
 
 In view of these results, we conclude the paper by asking the deeper question on which 
are the most important benefits from trade liberalization. Our results highlight the fact 
that domestic reforms and trade reforms are interlinked. Trade liberalization promotes 
domestic reforms, often institutional in nature, which may produce large welfare gains. 
These benefits should be added to the direct benefits from tariff reduction. As a result, the 
overall benefits from trade liberalization are significantly larger that the benefits 
predicted by traditional studies. 
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  24APPENDIX 
 
The explicit functional forms used in the economic analysis are: 
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1 c : consumption of composite traded good 
2 c : consumption of non-traded good 
Dsj y : domestic production of good  (traded, non-traded) by ownership  j s (public, private) 
sji z : input of good i(traded, non-traded) by sector   (traded, non-traded) of ownership  j s  
  25sj k : capital input in sector   by ownership  j s  
sj l : capital input in sector   by ownership  j s  
1 y : production of the composite traded good (used in consumption and production) 
D x : Domestic demand of the domestically produced traded good 
m: imports 
i: investment 
1 I z : input of traded good into the investment sector 
2 I z : input of non-traded good into the investment sector 
F x : Foreign demand of domestically produced traded good 
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Table 1.  Gross Industrial Output Value by Ownership (100 million Renminbi (Chinese 
Yuan)) 
 
Share of Total (%) 














1978  4237  3289  948                                     78  22 
1980 5154 3916  1213 1 24 76  24  0
1985 9716 6302  3117 180 117 65  32  3
1990 23924 13064  8523 1290 1047 55  36  10
1991 26625 14955  8783 1287 1600 56  33  11
1992 34599 17824  12135 2006 2634 52  35  13
1993 48402 22725  16464 3861 5352 47  34  19
1994 70176 26201  26472 7082 10421 37  38  25
1995 91894 31220  33623 11821 15231 34  37  29
1996 99595 36173  39232 15420 16582 36  39  32
1997 113733  35968  43347 20376 20982 32  38  36
1998 119048  33621  45730 20372 27270 28  38  40
1999 126111  35571  44607 22928 32962 28  35  44
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
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Table 2. Investment (billion yuan) 
 
   Total  State-owned  Share of SOE 
1980 91  75 82
1985 254  168 66
1986 312  208 67
1987 379  245 65
1988 475  302 64
1989 441  281 64
1990 452  299 66
1991 559  371 66
1992 808  550 68
1993 1307  793 61
1994 1704  962 56
1995 2002  1090 54
1996 2291  1201 52
1997 2494  1309 52
1998 2841  1537 54
1999 2985  1595 53
2000 3292  1650 50
2001 37213  17607 47






  28Table 3. Number of Employed Persons with SOE as a subcategory of urban employment 
(million persons) 
 
   
Year  Total  Urban   SOE   Rural Non-










                        
1978  401.5  95.1  74.5 28.3 278.1 78.3 60.4 18.6
1980  423.6  105.3  80.2 30.0 288.4 76.2 59.3 18.9
1985  498.7  128.1  89.9 69.8 300.9 70.2 45.4 18.0
1990  647.5  170.4  103.5 108.7 368.4 60.7 37.1 16.0
1991  654.9  174.7  106.6 113.4 366.9 61.1 37.0 16.3
1992  661.5  178.6  108.9 124.9 358.0 61.0 35.9 16.5
1993  668.1  182.6  109.2 145.4 340.0 59.8 33.3 16.3
1994  674.6  186.5  112.1 148.8 339.2 60.1 33.4 16.6
1995  680.7  190.4  112.6 163.9 326.4 59.1 31.8 16.5
1996  689.5  199.2  112.4 173.7 316.6 56.4 30.2 16.3
1997  698.2  207.8  110.4 171.7 318.7 53.1 29.1 15.8
1998  706.4  216.2  90.6 171.3 318.9 41.9 23.4 12.8
1999  713.9  224.1  85.7 175.0 314.8 38.2 21.5 12.0
2000  720.9  231.5  81.0 168.9 320.4 35.0 20.2 11.2
2001  730.3  239.4  76.4 169.0 321.8 31.9 18.7 10.5
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Table 4. The Subsidies to SOE by the Central and Local Governments 
(Unit: 100 million yuan) 
 
   Local Central  Total  Percentage of  
SOE output 
1990  460.87 118.01  578.88  4.4 
1991  365.55 144.69  510.24  3.4 
1992  290.62 154.34  444.96  2.5 
1993  306.76 104.53  411.29  1.8 
1994  268.29 97.93  366.22  1.4 
1995  281.01 46.76  327.77  1.0 
1996  280.20 57.20  337.40  0.9 
1997  272.75 95.74  368.49  1.0 
1998  258.81 74.69  333.50  1.0 
Source: WTO Accession Documents Submitted by China 
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Figure 1. Relative Change in SOE Employment 
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  33Figure 3 (cont). Steady state values as the subsidy to capital is reduced 
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